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The number of employers that require employees to agree to mandatory arbitration of disputes as a 
condition of employment has increased in recent years. One particular motivating factor is an increase in 
the volume of discrimination claims, which has accompanied the expansion of the employee classes 
protected by state and federal anti-discrimination statutes. The employers' goals in requiring arbitration 
are to avoid the expense and time involved in litigation, as well as the specter of unreasonable jury 
awards. More cynically, critics of mandatory arbitration suggest that another reason that employers favor 
arbitration is the perception that arbitration works to the disadvantage of employees. Part of the difficulty 
in establishing whether one party or the other benefits more from litigation or arbitration is the inherent 
differences in the cases that reach one forum or the other. An analysis finds no support for the idea that 
arbitration necessarily favors employers. Indeed, the cost of litigation makes it unlikely that an employee 
with a legitimate, though small value claim would even be heard in court. Instead, contingent-fee 
attorneys would tend to stay away from a small claim, while state and federal agencies, notably the 
federal Equal Employment Opportunity Corporation, have a bias toward settling claims, regardless of the 
equity of that settlement. Considering that the best resolution is one that both parties achieve freely on 
their own, both litigation and arbitration represent a type of systemic failure. Current research has found 
that arbitration is faster in achieving a resolution than is litigation. There is no way to establish whether 
payments or damages are higher in litigation than in arbitration, and research has failed to show a bias 
toward either employees or employers in arbitration. Indeed, establishing bias begs the fundamental 
question, which is whether a system that favors one side, employees, for instance, is actually more fair 
than a system in which either side could prevail. Ideally, the system should provide damages for 
employees who actually have been hurt by discrimination, while at the same time it should provide speedy 
exoneration for employers who have been unfairly tarred by accusations of discrimination. The present 
system does neither. 
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Mandatory Arbitration:
Why Alternative Dispute Resolution 
May Be the Most Equitable Way to 
Resolve Discrimination Claims
 David Sherwyn, J.D., is associate professor of law at the Cornell Universit School of Hotel Ad-
ministration (dss18@cornell.edu). His primary research focus is labor and employment law issues 
relevant to the hospitality industry; specifically, mandatory arbitration of discrimination lawsuits 
and sexual harassment. Among his publications are articles in the Stanford Law Review, Berkeley 
Journal of Employment and Labor Law, the Fordham Law Review, the University of Pennsylvania Journal 
of Labor and Employment Law, and the Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly.
by David Sherwyn
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ExECUTiVE SUMMARy
The number of employers that require employees to agree to mandatory arbitration of dis-putes as a condition of employment has increased in recent years. One particular moti-vating factor is an increase in the volume of discrimination claims, which has accompa-nied the expansion of the employee classes protected by state and federal 
anti-discrimination statutes. The employers’ goals in requiring arbitration are to avoid the expense and 
time involved in litigation, as well as the specter of unreasonable jury awards. More cynically, critics of 
mandatory arbitration suggest that another reason that employers favor arbitration is the perception 
that arbitration works to the disadvantage of employees. 
Part of the difficulty in establishing whether one party 
or the other benefits more from litigation or arbitration is 
the inherent differences in the cases that reach one forum 
or the other. An analysis finds no support for the idea that 
arbitration necessarily favors employers. Indeed, the cost 
of litigation makes it unlikely that an employee with a 
legitimate, though small value claim would even be heard 
in court. Instead, contingent-fee attorneys would tend to 
stay away from a small claim, while state and federal agen-
cies, notably the federal Equal Employment Opportunity 
Corporation, have a bias toward settling claims, regardless 
of the equity of that settlement. 
Considering that the best resolution is one that both 
parties achieve freely on their own, both litigation and 
arbitration represent a type of systemic failure. Current 
research has found that arbitration is faster in achieving 
a resolution than is litigation. There is no way to establish 
whether payments or damages are higher in litigation 
than in arbitration, and research has failed to show a 
bias toward either employees or employers in arbitration. 
Indeed, establishing bias begs the fundamental question, 
which is whether a system that favors one side, employees, 
for instance, is actually more fair than a system in which 
either side could prevail. Ideally, the system should provide 
damages for employees who actually have been hurt by 
discrimination, while at the same time it should provide 
speedy exoneration for employers who have been unfairly 
tarred by accusations of discrimination. The present sys-
tem does neither.
A case study of a large employer depicts the favor-
able effects of a program of alternative dispute resolution. 
Employment at the company in question grew substantially 
during the study period and the number of contacts to its 
dispute resolution program likewise expanded. However 
the percentage of those claims that required outside re-
sources (either mediation or arbitration) was under 10 per-
cent, compared to some 26 percent of claims through the 
federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission that 
end up in court. Likewise the number of days to resolution 
for Employer 1 was tiny compared to the average 373 for 
EEOC, and claims paid by Employer 1 averaged one-third 
of the EEOC average.
6	 The	Center	for	Hospitality	Research	•	Cornell	University	
ChR REPoRTS
Although many employers embrace arbitration, it also 
has detractors. Critics contend that a mandatory-arbitration 
policy may not be legally enforceable, is unfair to employees, 
and does not really benefit employers. In this CHR Report, 
I plan to cut through the rhetoric surrounding arbitration 
policies and provide employers with systemic method for 
evaluating whether their company should implement an 
arbitration policy. To that end, this report (1) explains the 
problems with the discrimination-adjudication system that 
drew employers’ attention to arbitration, (2) sets forth the 
law of arbitration; and (3) provides empirical data compar-
ing arbitration and litigation systems.
A	Growth	Industry
Over the past 20 years, employment litigation has increased 
by 400 percent, primarily due to discrimination claims.1 
1 Stuart H. Bompey et al., The Attack on Arbitration and Mediation of 
Employment Disputes, 13 Lab. Law. 21 (1997) (citing Discharge Is Now 
Major Focus of Job Discrimination Suits, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 164, at 
A-3 (Aug. 23, 1991)).
Three major changes in the law may be responsible for this 
increase.2 The first change is the increase in the number of 
protected classes. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, national 
origin, religion, and sex.3 Subsequent Congressional legisla-
2 There may be additional explanations for the continued burgeoning 
federal employment-discrimination litigation caseloads. John Donohue 
and Peter Siegelman present several explanations including: increased un-
employment rates, general economic downturn, demographic growth in 
the protected work force, with minorities and women taking better paying 
jobs, and the “integration effect.” (An integrated work force is more likely 
to produce litigation because minorities or women who work by them-
selves have no benchmarks against whom they can measure their treat-
ment and determine whether it is discriminatory.) See: John J. Donohue 
and Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination 
Litigation, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 983, 1001 (1991); and Majorie L. Baldwin 
& William G. Johnson, The Employment Effects of Wage Discrimination 
against Black Men, 49 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 302 (1996). 
3 Title VII, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. §2000e-§2000e17 (1994)).
Mandatory Arbitration:
T
he last 15 years have seen the growth of mandatory-arbitration policies in the hospitality industry. 
Under these polices employees agree, as a condition of employment, to waive their right to a jury 
trial in exchange for the right to have their case heard by an arbitrator. The attraction of arbitration 
policies for employers is the prospect of avoiding negative publicity, expense, and inefficiencies 
associated with litigation. As I explain below, this interest in arbitration has been provoked in large part 
by litigation connected with employment-discrimination claims.
Why Alternative Dispute Resolution May Be the Most 
Equitable Way to Resolve Discrimination Claims
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tion expanded the protected classes to include age,4 preg-
nancy,5 and disability.6 In 1994, for instance, disability claims 
accounted for 22.6 percent of the total number of charges 
with the EEOC.7 Age cases accounted for 19.9 percent.8 In 
addition, many states, cities, and counties protect other clas-
sifications such as marital status9 and sexual orientation.10
Beyond statutory classifications federal courts increased 
the number of causes of action available to plaintiffs by 
developing the legal theories of sexual harassment11 and 
disparate impact,12 and also resurrecting Section 1981 of 
4 The ADEA, Pub. L. No. 90-202 at 15, 18 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as 
amended 29 U.S.C. § 621-634 (1994 & Supp. I 1995)), took effect in 1968. 
Donohue and Siegelman reported that 15.1% of 1,250 randomly selected 
employment civil rights cases filed in seven major cities from 1972 to 1987 
were based on age discrimination. Donohue & Siegelman, op.cit. See also: 
Christine Jolls, Hands-Tying and the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 1813, 1814 (1996); and George Rutherglen, From Race 
to Age: The Expanding Scope of Employment Discrimination Law, 24 J. 
Legal Stud. 491, PAGE (1995).
5 See: 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994). Though the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act did not create a new protected class, the number of complaints of 
discrimination under the PDA grew from 3,693 in 1981 to 5,090 in 1985. 
Final Amendments to EEOC Guidelines on Sex Discrimination, Daily Lab. 
Rep. (BNA) No. 78, at E-5 (Apr. 20, 1994).
6 The ADA requires that covered employers make reasonable accom-
modations for the known disability of any “otherwise qualified individual 
with a disability.” ADA, 42 USC § 12112(b)(5). The ADA became effective 
in July 1994 for employers with 15 or more employees. 
7 EEOC Office of Program Operations, Ann. Rep. 11-12 (1994).
8 Office of Program Operations, EEOC Enforcement Statistics, 
FY 1984-1994 (Feb. 1995). Note, however, that overlapping claims may 
inflate the significance of these percentages. That is, some plaintiffs bring 
claims alleging multiple types of discrimination, such as discrimination 
against race, sex, and age. Donohue and Siegelman (cited in notes 2 and 4 
above) filter out the overlap effect, but the EEOC statistics do not. 
9 For example, see: Cal. Gov’t Code § 19572 (West 1995 & Supp. 1998); 
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-60 (1995); D.C. Code Ann. § 1-2512 (Supp. 
1997); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 760.07 (West Supp. 1998); and Haw. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 368-1 (Michie 1994).
10 For example, see: Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 151B § 4 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 
1997); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 363.03 (West 1991 & Supp. 1998); N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 10:5-12.5 (West Supp. 1997); R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-1 to –9 (1995 
& Supp. 1997); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 3, § 961 (1995); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. 
§ 49.60.180 (West Supp.1998); and Wis. Stat. Ann. § 111.31 (West 1997).
11  See: Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), holding that a 
hostile environment caused by sexual conduct can create a cause of action 
under Title VII.
12 See: Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), holding that an 
employment policy that is neutral on its face can constitute a Title VII 
violation if it creates an adverse impact. For example, the Duke Power 
Company required applicants for certain positions to be high school 
graduates. The Court examined the 1960 North Carolina census, found 
that 34% of states white residents were high school graduates and only 
12% of the African-Americans had diplomas. This disparity, according to 
the Court, constituted a Title VII violation. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 
ended the adverse impact debate, if there was one, by adopting the Griggs 
holding as the law. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 
1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (1994).
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which protects employees and 
applicants from racial discrimination even if the employer 
is not covered by Title VII.13 Finally, the Civil Rights Act of 
1991 (CRA) made employment-discrimination claims more 
attractive to plaintiffs and their attorneys by providing for 
punitive damages, compensatory damages, and jury trials.14  
The new damages scheme increased the average amount of 
settlements. In particular, after the CRA of 1991, employees 
have an incentive to reject settlement offers of full back pay, 
in the hope that a jury will award them damages far exceed-
ing the true value of the case. Thus, plaintiffs and their attor-
neys have incentive to turn down what had been full relief in 
the hopes of winning the employment-discrimination lottery. 
The	EEOC’s	System:	Expensive	and	Inefficient
As I explain in this section, the current system for adjudicat-
ing discrimination cases is so expensive and inefficient that it 
is unfair to both employers and employees. To file a dis-
crimination lawsuit against an employer, an employee must 
first file a charge of discrimination with either the EEOC or 
with the appropriate state or local agency.15 The agency with 
which employee files a charge will investigate the allegation 
and try to settle the matter by having the employer remuner-
ate or reinstate the employee. If the employer and employee 
cannot agree on a settlement, the agency determines 
whether there is cause to believe that discrimination oc-
curred. If the agency finds “no cause,” it issues a “right to sue 
letter,” and the employee can still file an action in federal or 
state court. If the agency finds cause it may issue the right-to-
sue letter; set the case for trial before its own administrative 
adjudication process; or become the employee’s counsel and 
file an action in federal court on the claimant’s behalf.16
In establishing the procedures I just described, Con-
gress attempted but failed to develop a system that would 
13 Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 prohibits discrimination 
against racial minorities in the “making and enforcement of contracts.” In 
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc. 421 U.S. 454 (1975), the Supreme 
Court expanded Section 1981’s prohibitions to provide damages to those 
who proved employment discrimination, regardless of the size of the 
employer. Unlike Title VII, which defines an employer as a company that 
has 15 or more employees, Section 1981 claims can be brought against 
any employer regardless of size. 
14 See: 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. The 1991 amendments provide for punitive and 
compensatory damages. Such damages, however, are “capped” based on 
the number of employees working at a company. 
15 See: 29 U.S.C. § 626(d); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. Employees can choose to 
file with either the federal, state, or local agency. In most circumstances, 
the agencies have concurrent jurisdiction so that claims are cross-filed 
among each agency. 
16 One commentator notes that instead of issuing a no-cause finding, 
many EEOC offices inform the plaintiff of its intent to do so and afford 
the plaintiff an opportunity to request a right-to-sue notice. See: Michael 
Selmi, The Value of the EEOC: Reexamining the Agency’s Role in Employ-
ment Discrimination Law, 57 Ohio St. L.J. 1, 9 n.35 (1996).
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eliminate employment discrimination by providing employ-
ees with an agency that investigated and resolved all charges 
(regardless of potential damages) without exposing em-
ployers to the high costs associated with litigation. Instead, 
employers accused of discrimination face outrageous costs, 
and employees’ claims are not investigated in a thorough or 
timely manner. 
Expensive	for	Employers
When a discrimination claim is filed, employers are required 
to complete a questionnaire and provide the investigat-
ing agency with a position statement. This alone can cost 
thousands of dollars in attorneys’ fees, if an employer does 
not have in-house counsel. But even so, the employer loses 
productivity of employees involved in the case, may suffer 
adverse publicity, and faces uncertain liability. Beyond that, 
the costs of defending a claim give employers a strong incen-
tive for employers to settle a case regardless of the worthiness 
of the plaintiff ’s claim. I say this because of the following 
costs to employers: (1) between $4,000 and 10,000 to defend 
an EEOC charge; (2) at least $75,000 to take a case to sum-
mary judgment; and (3) at least $125,000 and possibly over 
$500,000 to defend a case a trial.17 Moreover, the chance of 
an adverse verdict increases the incentive to settle.18
Administrative procedures also provide investigators 
with incentives to settle cases, in part because the EEOC 
and numerous state agencies evaluate their investigators by 
examining how many cases they closed per quarter.19 From 
the time they are assigned to the case, investigators push 
employers and employees to settle.20 In fact, it was standard 
operating procedure for some state investigators to attempt 
17 As estimated by Gregg Gilman, chair of the Labor and Employment 
Department, Davis & Gilbert, LLP, and Paul Wagner, Partner, Shea, Stokes, 
& Carter, LLP.
18 See: Michael Barrier, Lawsuits Gone Wild, Nation’s Bus., Feb. 1998, 
at 12, who noted with Lane v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 889 
(1997) that one jury award for $89.5 million dollars which covered 
economic harm, emotional distress, and punitive damages, although the 
appellate court reduced the damages to $5.8 million.
19 In 1993 Linda G. Mora, the General Accounting Office’s director of 
education and employment issues, reported that of 68,000 cases closed 
in 1992 the EEOC found no cause in 61% and reasonable cause in 2.4%. 
She stated that this disparity could be explained, in part, by the fact that 
EEOC investigators have quarterly quotas for case closings, and those 
who do not meet this quota are given lower performance ratings. See 
EEOC’s Performance in Handling Caseload Criticized By Witness at House 
Hearing, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 143, at D-3 (July 28, 1993).
20 Gilbert F. Casellas, U.S.Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion Priority Charge Handling Procedures 11 (June 1995) states: 
“Charges under investigation that do not fall within the national or local 
enforcement plans and that are in Categories A or B may be settled at any 
time by the enforcement staff, with or without consultation with legal staff, 
as appropriate.”
to settle a case without even discussing the case’s merits or 
reviewing the file.21 
In the 1980s and early 1990s the EEOC accepted 
and investigated all charges.22 The state agencies not only 
accepted and investigated all charges, but they actually 
helped employees “fit” their facts into criteria that would 
create a prima facie case—that is, what amounts to a 
guaranteed win for the employee.23 The “guaranteed win” 
comes from  what I refer to as “the de facto severance system” 
for discrimination cases. In this system, employees can file 
baseless discrimination charges because they know that their 
former employers are willing to hand over up to six months’ 
pay to avoid the costs and aggravation that will arise in 
defending the allegation. 
Also supporting the concept of de facto severance is the 
fact that it is simple (and inexpensive) for employees to file 
charges of discrimination, yet costly for employers to defend 
against charges. To file a charge of discrimination, employees 
must establish a prima facie case. To do so, employees need 
only prove: (1) that they are members of a protected class; 
(2) that they were qualified for the position; (3) that they 
were “mistreated” by their employer or potential employer; 
and (4) that employees who do not belong to that protected 
class were not mistreated.24 Employees establishing a prima 
facie case do not have to provide any evidence of discrimina-
tion, do not need an attorney, and need not pay a filing fee. 
A	New	System	Compromises	Employee	Claims
In 1995, the EEOC created new procedures intended to 
reduce the backlog of cases and to weed out frivolous cases.25 
These procedures included: (1) encouraging settlement at all 
steps of the process; (2) priority charge handling; and  
(3) rescission of the full-investigation policy. Instead of re-
solving the system’s inefficiencies, however, the new policies 
perpetuate and exacerbate some of the problems identified 
above. Moreover, they effectively make it impossible for 
some employees to have their cases heard.
Encouraging settlement at all phases of the investiga-
tion further institutionalizes the practice of providing de 
facto severance for employees with baseless claims, while not 
making full payments to employees with meritorious claims. 
21 As an example, the Illinois Department of Human Rights used to assign 
“interim investigators” for this purpose. If the case did not settle, it would 
then sit for approximately two years before it was assigned to an investiga-
tor who would examine the merits.
22 The “full investigation” policy was rescinded in 1995.
23 The nature of this system encourages this behavior. The federal govern-
ment bases the amount of funding it will provide to a state agency on the 
number of claims that are received. 
24 McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
25 See: Casellas, loc.cit., at 2-3; see also: E.R. Munroe, The EEOC: Pattern 
and Practice Imperfect, 13 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 219 (1995). 
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Instead of attempting to discover whether the employer vio-
lated law, investigators are simply trying to “make the case 
go away,” thus attaining efficiency at the expense of justice.26 
The priority charge-handling policy effectively formal-
izes the procedures investigators have used for years.27 Cases 
placed in the “A” or highest priority classification generally 
focus on class actions and new areas of law. In these cases, 
the EEOC will litigate on behalf of the employee or the class. 
Second-priority cases, the “B” cases, are often those that 
involve an allegation by one or two employees, and in the 
agency’s view are not likely to generate new or important is-
sues of law. These are the cases that are investigated and also 
slated for the EEOC’s mediation process. Finally, cases that 
the EEOC determines are frivolous or outside the agency’s 
jurisdiction falls into the “C” category. These cases are usu-
ally administratively terminated.
Few	Complaints	Go	to	Federal	Court	
To file a claim in federal court, it is essential to retain 
competent counsel. This is expensive for employers and out 
of reach for employees, unless they retain an attorney who 
works on a contingency basis. In that regard, the EEOC’s 
resolution of a charge should function as a signal to plaintiffs’ 
lawyers regarding whether a case will be profitable to pursue. 
That does not occur, however, because the EEOC dismisses 
the overwhelming majority of cases without regard to the 
merits of these cases. By doing so, the EEOC has created a 
perception among plaintiffs’ lawyers that the investigation’s 
results are meaningless.28 Thus, attorneys base their deci-
sions to take a case on their own determination of potential 
back pay and the depth of the employer’s pockets, rather 
than the merits of the case. 
26 Peter Albrecht, partner, Godfrey & Kahn in Madison, Wisconsin, 
reports that this problem occurred when the Illinois Department of Hu-
man Rights used to assign interim investigators who were charged with 
attempting to settle cases before they investigated. 
27 See: Casellas, loc.cit. Peter Albrecht observed that this approach pro-
vides little or no benefit for plaintiffs with B cases.
28 Interviews with Chicago attorney Elizabeth Hubbard.
The actual litigation is a heart-wrenching marathon 
that takes two-and-a-half years on average and can last for 
more than ten years.29 In the process, the parties tear at each 
other’s character and integrity—leaving both with damaged 
reputations. Employees may find themselves blacklisted 
when they attempt to return to work,30 and employers 
may have to rebuild their reputations even after baseless 
accusations.
I paint this grim picture because the current system 
hurts the good actors, but benefits the bad. Both employees 
with legitimate claims and employers falsely accused of dis-
crimination are hurt in this process, while the actions of em-
ployers who discriminate and employees who file frivolous 
claims are facilitated when investigators and lawyers push 
settlements. To that end, they encourage innocent employers 
to settle frivolous cases by threatening them with the costs 
of investigation and litigation and pressure employees with 
meritorious cases to settle by threatening them with delays, 
the probability of a no-cause finding, and the financial and 
emotional costs of litigation.
The failures of the current system are clear. In place of 
litigation and forced settlements, arbitration could be a bet-
ter alternative provided it is lawful and solves the problems 
associated with litigation without creating other problems. 
Next, I’ll set forth the law and then consider whether arbitra-
tion has been a better way to resolve claims than litigation.
The	Law	of	Mandatory	Arbitration	
The U.S. Supreme Court has issued at least five holdings 
regarding arbitration of discrimination claims. In addition, 
hundreds of Circuit Court and District Court rulings have 
been published, along with a similar number of law review 
29 While the average varies across jurisdictions, the average remains close 
to 2 or 3 years. See: Lois A. Baar and Michael A Zody, Resolution Confer-
ences Conducted by the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division: The Elements 
of a Successful Administrative Mediation Program, 21 J. Contemp. L. 21, 28 
(1995); Richard D. Wilkins, Arbitrate or Out!, Cent. N.Y. Bus. J., Feb. 5, 
1996, at 1.
30 See: Amy Saltzman, Life After the Lawsuit, U.S. News & World Rep., 
Aug. 19, 1996, at 57.
The current system hurts the 
good actors—both employers 
and employees—but benefits 
the bad.
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articles on this subject.31 With respect to legality of manda-
tory arbitration, four issues have, for the most part, domi-
nated the arbitration discussion. Those are: (1) the role of 
the EEOC; (2) whether the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 
applies to employment contracts, (3) the effect of Section 
118 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991; and (4) what constitutes 
a “fair” arbitration agreement. Only the fourth of those three 
issues—what is a fair arbitration policy—remains unre-
solved, despite the fact that there is substantial amount of 
judicial authority on the topic. The sections below explain 
the development of the law concerning each of these issues.
Early	Arbitration	Law
Prior to 1991, lawyers, judges and scholars generally accept-
ed that mandatory arbitration agreements were unenforce-
able with regard to cases filed under federal employment 
anti-discrimination statutes particularly in light of Alexander 
v. Gardner-Denver.32 In 1991, however, the Supreme Court 
decided Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., which 
distinguished the Gardner-Denver holding that led to the 
supposition of unenforceability as being based on collective-
bargaining agreements. The Gilmer case arose when Robert 
Gilmer, a 62-year-old registered securities representative, 
was terminated. He alleged that the company discriminated 
against him because of his age. Gilmer’s employer filed a 
motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the FAA because 
Gilmer had signed an agreement with the National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers to arbitrate all disputes that arose 
out of his employment. Signing such an agreement was a 
condition of working on the New York Stock Exchange.33 
Gilmer contended that the agreement was unenforceable un-
der Gardner-Denver. In disagreeing with Gilmer’s contention, 
the Court distinguished Gardner-Denver on its facts because 
in that case the arbitration occurred pursuant to a collective-
31 For example, see: Richard A. Bales, Compulsory Employment Arbitra-
tion and the EEOC, 27 Pepp. L. Rev. 1 (1999); Samuel Estreicher, Predis-
pute Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 1344 (1997); Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes 
in the Debate Over Mandatory Employment Arbitration, 16 Ohio St. J. on 
Disp. Resol. 559 (2001); Delphene Hardin, Sacrificing Statutory Rights on 
the Altar of Pre-Dispute Employment Agreements Mandating Arbitration, 
28 Cap. U.L. Rev. 455 (2000).
32 See: Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974); Utley v. 
Goldman Sachs & Co., 883 F.2d 184, 187 (1st Cir. 1989); and Swenson v. 
Management Recruiters Int’l, Inc., 872 F.2d 264 (8th Cir. 1989).
33 500 U.S. 20 (1991). The employment application signed by Gilmer 
provided that the employee agrees to “arbitrate any dispute, claim or con-
troversy” arising between the applicant and the employer “that is required 
to be arbitrated under the rules, constitutions or by-laws of the organiza-
tions” with which the applicant registers. Gilmer had registered with the 
New York Stock Exchange, which has a rule providing for arbitration of 
“any controversy between a registered representative and any member or 
member organization arising out of the employment or termination of 
employment of such registered representative.” 
bargaining agreement as opposed to an individual contract. 
Following the Gilmer decision, lower courts extended the 
holding to apply to other discrimination statutes in addition 
to the ADEA.
Despite compelling arbitration, the Gilmer Court left 
several questions unresolved. Two of the most-debated open 
issues concerned the role of the EEOC and the scope and ap-
plicability of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) to contracts 
of employment. The Court finally resolved these issues in 
its EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc. and Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. 
Adams decisions.
Development	and	Clarification	of	the	EEOC’s	
Role
Gilmer raised a question of the EEOC’s role when employers 
required employees to arbitrate disputes. Specifically, em-
ployers needed to know whether: (1) employees could still 
file claims with the EEOC;34 (2) the EEOC could file lawsuits 
on behalf of employees bound by such agreements; and (3) 
if so, could the EEOC seek monetary damages on employees’ 
behalf or would it be limited to seeking injunctive relief?
The answer to the first issue is affirmative. The Court 
wrote: “An individual ADEA claimant subject to an arbi-
tration agreement will still be free to file a charge with the 
EEOC, even though the claimant is not able to institute a 
private judicial action.”35 
The Court’s answer to the question of whether the 
EEOC could sue was less direct. The ensuing litigation was 
resolved in EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc, in which the majority 
held that the EEOC has the right to sue on behalf of em-
ployees and, in answer to the third issue, may seek monetary 
relief. 36 
Although Waffle House represents a significant legal 
holding and resolved an important open question, the 
holding has had little effect on most employers. The EEOC 
litigates a minuscule fraction of the discrimination charges 
it receives. For example, in the year 2000, the EEOC received 
just under 80,000 discrimination charges and filed lawsuits 
in 291 cases, which is less than one-third of 1 percent of 
those filed.37 
Furthermore, the cases litigated by the EEOC should 
not be arbitrated. As I explained above, the EEOC prefers 
to litigate cases involving novel or unsettled areas of law, or 
34 See, for example: Great Western Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F. 3d 
222 (3d Cir. 1997) (New Jersey Law Against Discrimination); Patterson 
v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832 (8th Cir.1997) (Title VII and state 
law discrimination claims); and Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc., 39 F. 3d 1482 (10th Cir. 1994) (Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1998)). 
35 Indeed, Gilmer filed a charge with the EEOC in this case.
36 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
37 See: Id., fn. 26.
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The key factor in determining that the Circuit City 
agreement was procedurally unconscionable is the fact that 
the company offered the contract on a take-it-or-leave-it ba-
sis—which the Ninth Circuit considered to indicate unequal 
bargaining power. That logic seems to contradict the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s statement in Gilmer, that “mere inequality 
in bargaining power” is not sufficient to hold that arbitration 
agreements are not enforceable. Despite the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding, I have not found any other circuits holding that 
take-it-or-leave-it arbitration agreements are procedurally 
unfair.43 The Ninth Circuit, however, will refuse to enforce 
an agreement only if the agreement is both procedurally and 
substantively unfair. Thus, the Ninth Circuit will enforce a 
substantively unfair agreement that is, however, procedurally 
fair. Conversely, regardless of the procedure, no other circuit 
will enforce what it believes to be an unfair agreement. 
What	Constitutes	a	Fair	Agreement
Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has defined 
what constitutes a “fair” arbitration agreement, but enough 
authority exists on the issue to extrapolate fairly reliable and 
comprehensive guidelines. In examining fairness, Gilmer 
and its progeny focus on the following seven issues: (1) how 
the costs of arbitration are allocated among the parties;  
(2) the procedures for selecting the arbitrator; (3) mutuality 
of terms; (4) whether the employee entered into the 
agreement knowingly and voluntarily; (5) available damages; 
(6) the method of delivering opinions; and (7) discovery 
limitations.44 
With respect to the first three issues, one can ensure 
enforceability if the employer pays the entire cost of the 
arbitration, both parties are permitted a substantial role in 
selecting the arbitrator, and both sides agree that arbitration 
will be the exclusive forum for both parties’ disputes.45
Issue number four covers take-it-or-leave-it offers. 
Once again, only the Ninth Circuit holds such terms to be 
43 Professor Sam Estreicher suggests that most employees will sign 
anything at the time of hire. Employers therefore may be afflicted by a 
perverse incentive to create unfair one-sided agreements with opt-out 
provisions. Such agreements: (1) will satisfy the Ninth Circuit’s standards 
and (2) bind employees because it is unlikely they will assertively opt out 
of such agreements. This anomaly is specific to California law. 
44 The Supreme Court in Gilmer reiterated the so-called savings clause of 
§ 2 of the FAA (arbitration agreements are enforceable “save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract”), 
500 U.S. at 33; 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). The Court also stated that “[t]here is no 
indication in this case, however, that Gilmer, an experienced businessman, 
was coerced or defrauded into agreeing to the arbitration clause in his 
registration application.”
45 Requiring mutuality make not make sense because employers gener-
ally pursue a different breed of claims against their employees (typically, 
noncompetition or trade secret matters) than employees typically pursue 
against their employers (discrimination, contract, and tort claims). Ap-
propriate relief is different for the two classes of cases.
those requiring class-wide relief in the form of a class- 
action suit. These are precisely the types of case that belong 
in court because precedent-setting opinions regarding unset-
tled law should come from judges. In contrast, the appropri-
ate cases for arbitrators are those that involve the application 
of well-established law to findings of fact. 
Plugging	a	Further	Hole	in	the	FAA
As a basis for enforcing Gilmer’s arbitration, the Court cited 
the fact that the Federal Arbitration Act required the court 
to compel arbitration. Gilmer, on the other hand, contended 
that the FAA did not apply, because Section 1 of the FAA 
excludes from the act’s coverage “contracts of employ-
ment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of 
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”38 The 
Court sidestepped this exclusion in Gilmer, holding that the 
arbitration agreement at issue was not a “contract of employ-
ment” at all, because the parties to the agreement were the 
New York Stock Exchange and Gilmer, not the “employer” 
and the “employee.”39 It took another case, Circuit City Stores, 
Inc. v. Adams,40 for the Court to address the question of 
whether the Section 1 phrase “engaged in foreign or inter-
state commerce” referred to all employees or only those in 
the transportation industry. In this case the Court held that 
the exclusion was limited to the transportation industry, and 
that the FAA applied to arbitration agreements relating to 
employment in all other industries. However, the Supreme 
Court’s holding once again failed to address a major issue, 
namely, the minimum due-process standards needed to 
allow a mandatory arbitration agreement to pass judicial 
muster.
The	Evolution	of	Due	Process	of	Mandatory	
Arbitration	Agreements
This matter of due process became the next point in the Cir-
cuit City case. On remand, bloody but unbowed, the Ninth 
Circuit, in what may be referred to as Circuit City II,41 again 
refused to compel arbitration. This time the Ninth Circuit 
invoked section 2 of the FAA, which exempts from arbitra-
tion all contracts that are invalid “upon such grounds as 
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”42 
Taking a page from California contract law, the court held 
that the contract was unenforceable because it was both 
procedurally and substantively unconscionable. 
38 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). 
39 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 n. 2. This minor detail spawned hundreds of 
lawsuits over the past decade and cost litigants millions of dollars.
40 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
41 9 U.S.C. § 2.
42 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams 279 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2002).
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unconscionable. In the rest of the country, arbitration agree-
ments are enforceable so long as they clearly describe the 
terms of the agreement (e.g., the agreements must state that 
discrimination claims are covered and that the document 
being signed is a binding legal contract) and are not hidden 
in an employee handbook or other long and intimidating 
document.46 
There is conflicting authority on how arbitration agree-
ments may limit damages available to prevailing parties. 
Case law and a mass of scholarly work support the argument 
that arbitration agreements must permit the arbitrator to 
award the same damages that would be available to parties 
had they prevailed in court.47 In contrast, some cases hold 
and others imply that arbitration agreements are enforce-
able even if they limit damages compared to what might be 
available in court.48 Finally, arbitration agreements should 
provide for written opinions, and agreements must allow for 
at least some discovery, even if it is limited.
Considerations	of	Arbitration
Still not completely settled, the law of mandatory arbitra-
tion has evolved over the past decade such that employers 
in almost all jurisdictions can draft enforceable and bind-
ing broad-scope arbitration policies. Assuming that the law 
of arbitration continues to develop, employers will have to 
decide whether their company should implement an arbitra-
46 For example, see: Trumbull v. Century Mktg. Corp., 12 F. Supp. 2d 683 
(N.D. Ohio 1988).
47 For example, see: Graham Oil Co. v. Arco Products Co., 43 F.3d 1244 
(9th Cir. 1994). Additionally, in accordance with the National Rules for 
the Resolution of Employment Disputes, the arbitrator may grant any 
remedy or relief that the arbitrator deems just and equitable, including 
any remedy or relief that would be available to the parties had the matter 
been heard in court. See also: JAMS, “Policy on Employment Arbitration 
Minimum Standards of Procedural Fairness,” www.jamsadr.com/employ-
mentArb_min_stds.asp#two (last visited October 23, 2002); Cole v. Burns 
Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997); and Armendariz v. Founda-
tion Health Psychare Serv., Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83, 103 (Cal. 2000).
48 See: Degaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Case. (BNA) 
401 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 1996) (upholding an arbitration agreement that 
prevented the arbitrators from awarding punitive damages or injunctive 
relief of any kind); also see: Kinnebrew v. Gulf Insurance Co., 67 Fair Empl. 
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 189 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 28, 1994).
tion system. Arbitration advocates will say yes and contend 
that arbitration is private, faster, and less expensive. Critics 
will argue that arbitration is unfair. While it’s clear that arbi-
tration is private, whether it is faster, less expensive, and fair 
are empirical questions that I address below. 
Systemic	Differences	of	Arbitration	and	
Adjudication	Systems
While the literature often sheds more heat than light on 
arbitration issues, enough data exist to begin an examination 
of the following three questions: (1) is arbitration unfair to 
employees?; (2) is arbitration faster than litigation?; and (3) 
is arbitration less expensive than litigation?
Fairness. To answer the question of whether arbitra-
tion is fair to employees, researchers typically compare the 
win–loss record and monetary awards of cases adjudicated 
in arbitration against those adjudicated in litigation. The 
problem with this type of analysis is that these cases form 
two different streams. If there’s a disparity in outcomes, one 
cannot tell whether that involves the adjudication system or 
some other factor, such as the strength of the cases going to 
court or to arbitration, or a selection factor that determines 
which cases go to court and which cases end up in arbitra-
tion. The best way to make such a comparison would be to 
compare the outcome of a cases that are both arbitrated and 
litigated. 
Unfortunately, in the real world it is impossible to find 
a significant number of discrimination cases that were de-
cided in both forums.49 As a second best option, researchers 
are limited to comparing those two distinct streams of cases. 
Perhaps over time the sheer volume of cases will blunt the 
research-design problem, but it’s more likely that the stream 
of adjudicated and litigated cases will differ systematically.
Discrimination cases resolved through arbitration 
invariably flow from employers that have mandatory- 
49 In theory, union-represented employees may be able to both arbitrate 
and litigate a claim. See: Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 
(1974). In any event, even where plaintiffs attempt to litigate claims that 
have already been arbitrated, the award will often be given substantial 
weight in the litigation. For example, see: Collins v. New York City Transit 
Authority, 305 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2002).
Because of summary 
judgments, a large number of 
employee losses are excluded 
from the cases reaching a trial 
stage of the litigation stream.
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arbitration policies. Most of these policies have a number 
of internal steps to formal arbitration that perform critical 
filtering functions. Thus, before the cases reach formal ar-
bitration, they have likely undergone some form of internal 
review often coupled with mediation by an outsider. These 
so-called alternative-dispute-resolution processes allow the 
parties to analyze the case and provide several opportunities 
for settlement. On the other hand, while cases in litigation 
may have gone through EEOC investigation, conciliation, or 
mediation, many cases are filed in court with only perfunc-
tory EEOC processing. 
If corporate internal review and mediation steps have 
any value at all, I would expect a systematic difference in the 
“quality” of the cases that make it to arbitration as opposed to 
those cases that make it into court. That is, cases in arbitra-
tion would have been carefully considered and negotiated 
before going to an arbitrator. The internal reviews would 
likely skew win–loss arbitration results in favor of employers, 
because it makes sense that employers would settle the meri-
torious cases rather than allow them to go to arbitration.50 
Exacerbating this disparity in the types of case that 
end up in court from those going to arbitration is the rarity 
of summary judgment motions in arbitration. Thus, while 
cases that lack merit as a matter of law are excluded from 
litigation-outcome statistics, they may remain part of the 
arbitration-outcome statistics. Because the vast majority 
of successful summary-judgment motions are made by 
employers, the litigation record would be skewed in favor of 
employees. Put simply, a large number of employee losses 
are excluded from the cases reaching a trial stage of the 
litigation stream. 
Prior	Empirical	Studies
Bearing in mind the possible fallacies in comparing litiga-
tion and arbitration outcomes, I’ll review empirical studies 
that make such a comparison.
Win–Loss	Rates
Conventional academic wisdom after Gilmer held that em-
ployees would not fare well in arbitration. Scholars asserted 
that juries were employee friendly, but that arbitrators were, 
at best, less sympathetic to employees, and, at worst, biased. 
The perception that employees would be at a disadvantage 
fueled considerable outcry against arbitration.51 In response, 
50 For example, see: Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and 
Jurisdiction, 1996 Sup. Ct. Rev. 331, 385-88; Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration 
of Employment Discrimination Claims: Doctrine and Policy in the Wake of 
Gilmer, 14 Hofstra Lab. L.J. 1, 29 (1996); Sharona Hoffman, Mandatory 
Arbitration: Alternative Dispute Resolution or Coercive Dispute Suppres-
sion?, 17 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 131 (1996); and Jean R. Sternlight, 
Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference for 
Binding Arbitration, 74 Wash. U. L.Q. 637 (1996).
51 See: Sherwyn et al., at 76. 
a number of other scholars compared the win–loss rates in 
arbitration to those in litigation. In this section I report the 
results of six of these studies. 
What seems clear from the results of these studies is 
that the assertions of many critics of arbitration were either 
overstated or simply wrong. Samuel Estreicher reported new 
data along with those data originally presented by Lewis 
Maltby and Lisa B. Bingham.52 A cumulative look at these 
three scholars’ work finds that plaintiffs prevailed in only 
12 percent of federal cases terminated (whether decided by 
motions, settled, or withdrawn, as opposed to those adjudi-
cated) in 1994 and 15 percent of such cases in 1997.53
Examining employee-win rates at trial using data from 
cases adjudicated between June 1, 1992, and May 31, 1994, 
William M. Howard reported that employees prevailed 28 
percent of the time.54 In front of juries, employees prevailed 
at a rate of 38 percent, while in bench trials the employee-
win rate was 19 percent. In arbitrations conducted under the 
auspices of the American Arbitration Association (AAA), 
employee claimants prevailed in 68 percent of the cases. In 
securities-industry arbitration cases, employees prevailed 48 
percent of the time.55 While Howard did not examine cases 
terminated, he reported trial results. This difference resulted 
in an almost 100-percent increase in the win rate for em-
ployees, from 15 percent (of cases terminated) to 28 percent 
(of cases tried).
Theodore Eisenberg and Elizabeth Hill focused on 
win–loss rates at trial, but not at termination.56 Eisenberg 
and Hill analyzed data from state court trials in 1996, federal 
court trials in 1999, and 200 AAA arbitrations from 1999 
and 2000. They separated civil-rights employment disputes 
from non-civil-rights cases in their arbitration and court 
results. This is an important qualification because non-civil-
rights claims include breach-of-contract actions where the 
employer, for example, has to prove that it had cause to 
terminate the employee. Conversely, in civil-rights cases the 
52 Estreicher, op.cit.; Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitra-
tion and Civil Rights, 30 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 29 (1998); Lisa B. 
Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics 
in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 McGeorge L. 
Rev. 223 (1998); Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat 
Player Effect, 1 Employee. Rts. & Emp. Pol’y J. 189, (1997); and Lisa B. 
Bingham, Is There a Bias in Arbitration of Nonunion Employment Dis-
putes? An Analysis of Actual Cases and Outcomes, 6 Int’l J. of Conflict 
Mgmt. 369 (1995).
53 Estreicher, op.cit.
54 William M. Howard, Arbitrating Claims of Employment Discrimination: 
What Really Does Happen? What Really Should Happen?, Disp. Resol. J., 
Oct.-Dec. 1995, at 40.
55 Id.
56 Theodore Eisenberg and Elizabeth Hill, Employment Arbitration and 
Litigation: An Empirical Comparison, 2003 Pub. L. & Legal Theory Res. 
Paper Series 1, 14,
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employee must prove discrimination, a considerable shift in 
the burden of proof. Eisenberg and Hill also distinguished 
between “higher” and “lower” paid employees. In non-
civil-rights AAA employment cases, highly paid employees 
prevailed in 64.9 percent of their cases, while low-paid em-
ployees prevailed in 39.6 percent of their cases.57 Combin-
ing the results of both groups shows an employee win rate 
of 51 percent (n = 173). In state non-civil-rights cases, the 
employee win rate was 57 percent (n = 145). In civil-rights 
arbitrations, the employee win rate was 26 percent (n = 42).58 
In contrast, the state-court win rate was 44 percent (n = 160), 
while the employee win rate in federal court was 36 percent 
(n = 1,430). The difference between the employee-win rate 
in arbitration and that in federal trials is not statistically sig-
nificant.59 Eisenberg and Hill do find a significant difference 
between employee-success rates in discrimination cases that 
are arbitrated versus those that are litigated in state court.
Even though there is no significant difference between 
the employee win rate in federal court and that in arbitration, 
there’s a difference in summary-judgment motions. Maltby 
reports that in 1994 the federal courts issued definitive 
judgments in 3,419 cases.60 Sixty percent of those judgments 
arose as a result of dispositive motions in which employers 
prevailed 98 percent of the time. (Unlike Maltby’s study, cas-
es decided by motion are excluded from Eisenberg and Hill’s 
court data.) Arbitration cases that could have been decided 
by motion, had the matter been in litigation rather than 
57Id. at 13. It might be argued that these results reflect bias against lower 
paid employees, but differences in substantive law offer a better explana-
tion. Employers seeking to terminate an express “cause” provision in the 
contract of a higher paid employee face a much higher hurdle than they 
do in cases where employees work under “at will” contracts but may have 
a plausible discrimination claim. See: Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. 
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
58Id. at 14. Although Eisenberg and Hill separate civil-rights arbitrations 
into high- and low-paid employees, collapsing these cells facilitated com-
parisons across studies.
59Id. Because the distributions were not normal, the non-parametric 
Mann-Whitney test was used to compare the federal court, state court, 
and arbitrations means.
60Maltby, op.cit.
arbitration, are included in the arbitration data. If we apply 
Maltby’s 1994 percentages to the figures for 1999 and 2000, 
we can calculate an additional 858 cases decided by the fed-
eral courts on a dispositive motion (60% of 1,430) of which 
employers prevailed in 840 (98% of the 858 motions), while 
employees prevailed in 18 motions. Adding an additional 
840 employer victories and 18 additional employee victories, 
results in an employee-win rate of 24 percent—slightly lower 
than that in arbitration.
Repeat	Players	and	the	Due-process	Protocol
In 1997, Lisa Bingham concluded that employees were sig-
nificantly less successful in arbitration if their employer was 
a “repeat player,” defined as an employer who appeared in 
more than one award during the study period.61 Specifically, 
Bingham found that while employees won 63 percent of all 
cases combined, they won only 16 percent of cases against 
repeat players. Bingham did not claim to have determined 
the reason for the difference in win rates, but a number of 
readers, including the EEOC in a 1997 policy statement, 
inferred that pro-employer bias plainly explained the results 
and used Bingham’s work to attack arbitration.62
Numerous critiques of the Bingham study ensued. 
Critics argued that the study was flawed because there 
were only 31 repeat-player cases in the study and almost 
all the employers were large companies that could become 
future repeat players. One methodogical issue arose when 
Bingham tallied the results of an employer’s first case in the 
repeat-player column only after a second case from the same 
employer appeared. This raised the question of how the 
employer could be considered a repeat player in its first case. 
Moreover, the study’s window necessarily excluded future 
cases from employers that were not considered repeat play-
ers for the study’s purposes, even though they might have 
had cases decided outside the study period. 
In her subsequent study, Bingham studied 244 arbitra-
tion cases resulting in awards and found that employees 
61 Bingham (1997), op.cit
62 For example, see: EEOC, Policy Statement on Mandatory Arbitration, 
loc. cit.
One researcher found that 
resolution for employment-
discrimination cases in litigation 
took 680 days, while the average 
arbitration case took 260 days 
to resolve.
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prevailed 61 percent of the time (n = 162) when the em-
ployer was not a repeat player, but only 29 percent (n = 82) 
when it was a repeat player.63 While these results are striking, 
Bingham also compared the effect of an internal dispute- 
resolution program (DRP) to that of another path to arbitra-
tion. The results were almost identical to the breakdown 
of cases involving repeat players and non-repeat players. 
Employees prevailed 61 percent of the time (n = 168), when 
there was no DRP and 30 percent of the time (n = 76) when 
there was a DRP. These results suggest that the availability 
of an internal review process and the employer’s experience 
with employment cases likely explains the repeat-player ef-
fect. Bingham found no support for arbitrator bias.
Bingham also analyzed the 24 cases in her sample 
where there was a “repeat arbitrator,” defined as a second 
appearance by the same arbitrator (although not necessarily 
in a case involving the same employer). In these cases the 
employee prevailed 29 percent of the time, an employee-win 
rate similar to that when employers used a DRP. The com-
plications here are that it is not clear whether the first case 
that the arbitrator had with the employer is in the data set, 
and we do not know the win rate for cases where arbitrators 
make their initial appearance as contrasted with the win rate 
in their second and additional appearances. Given the small 
sample size and the murky methodology, we cannot use this 
study to test any arbitrator-bias hypothesis. 
Elizabeth Hill’s study of the 34 arbitration cases in her 
sample where the employer was a repeat player provides 
additional information.64 In 25 of these cases, the employer 
had an internal DRP in place, and employees won only 
24 percent of those cases. In the nine repeat-player cases 
without a DRP, employees won 44 percent of the time. Once 
again, samples of 34, 25, and nine are too small to yield 
reliable conclusions, but Hill’s study and Bingham’s second 
study suggest that the presence of a DRP helps explain any 
repeat-player effect.
Disposition	Speed
Arbitration advocates point to a shorter time period from 
claim to award as an important virtue of arbitration.65 Again, 
63 Lisa B. Bingham, “Employment Arbitration Before and After the Due 
Process Protocal for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes 
Arising Out of Employment: Preliminary Evidence That Self-Regulation 
Makes a Difference,” in Proceedings of the NYU 53rd Annual Con-
ference on Labor, ed. Samuel Estreicher and David Sherwyn (2004); 
See also: Bingham (1997), op.cit
64 Elizabeth Hill, Due Process at Low Cost: An Empirical Study of Employ-
ment Arbitration Under the Auspices of the American Arbitration Associa-
tion, 18 Ohio St. J. On Disp. Resol. 777 (2003).
65 For a general discussion about the relation between ADR policies and 
case disposition time, see: Michael Heise, Justice Delayed?: An Empirical 
Analysis of Civil Case Disposition Time, 50 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 813, 844-
47 (2000). 
the data involve cases that were actually litigated or arbitrat-
ed rather than the thousands resolved before any adjudica-
tion occurs. Unlike the controversy over win–loss ratios, few 
dispute the assertion that arbitration is faster than litigation. 
Maltby reports that the average employment-discrimina-
tion case in litigation was resolved in 679.5 days—just under 
two years—while the average arbitration case took 260 days 
(8.6 months) to resolve.66 Again, Maltby focuses on resolu-
tions not trials. Accordingly, his data include motions which 
reduce the time period for litigation.
Eisenberg and Hill compared the decision time of 
arbitrations to trials. They separated civil-rights cases from 
non-civil-rights employment claims in the arbitration and 
state-court data, but their federal-court data included both. 
For arbitrations, Eisenberg and Hill found that the aver-
age time to adjudicate a non-civil-rights AAA case was 250 
days (n = 172).67 Civil-rights AAA arbitration cases took, on 
average, 276 days (n = 42). In contrast, the mean time for 
state-court non-discrimination trials was 723 days (n = 170), 
state-court discrimination trials was 818 days (n = 163), and 
federal-court discrimination trials was 709 days (n = 1,430). 
Thus, according to Eisenberg and Hill, it takes parties more 
than twice as long to litigate a case than to arbitrate a case. 
Costs	and	Damages
As with the employee win rate, conventional wisdom sug-
gests that arbitration would reduce employees’ damage 
awards. One theory is that juries are employee friendly and 
will reward aggrieved employees while arbitrators will want 
to “split the baby” and keep awards low.68 Before discussing 
the data, let me review the role of damages in employment-
discrimination law.
All four federal statutes that define the employment- 
discrimination-law terrain use awards of back pay as a reme-
dial scheme for employees who have experienced discrimi-
nation. To review, those statutes are (1) Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 as amended in 1991 (Title VII);69 (2) the 
66 Maltby, op.cit.
67 Eisenberg and Hill, op.cit.
68 Support abounds for the general assertion that juries tilt favorably 
toward employees. For example, a 1993 juror poll by Dispute Dynamic, 
a consulting firm, found that 69 percent of the respondents agreed that 
for many company decision makers, an employee’s age, gender, or race 
influence promotion decisions. See David Sherwyn, J. Bruce Tracey, 
and Zev J. Eigen,  In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration of Employment 
Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing out the Bath Water, and Constructing 
a New Sink in the Process,  2 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 73, n. 16 (1999). In 
contrast, conventional wisdom surrounding arbitrators’ decisions focuses 
on their inclination to “split the baby” when it comes to awards. See: Lucy 
T. France and Timothy C. Kelly, Mandatory Arbitration of Civil Rights 
Claims in the Workplace: No Enforceability Without Equivalency, 64 Mont. 
L. Rev. 449 (2003).
6942 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (2000).
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Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA);70 (3) the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA);71 and (4) Section 
1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (1981).72 The specifics 
of the award determination differ among the statutes. ADEA 
provides for liquidated damages in an amount equal to back 
pay for willful violations. Title VII and the ADA provide 
for punitive and compensatory damages, but the damages 
are capped according to the number of employees in the 
company.73 The caps range from $50,000 for employers with 
15 through 100 employees and $300,000 for employers with 
more than 500 employees. Section 1981 has unlimited puni-
tive damages, but applies only to race (and certain ethnic 
ancestries). Finally, certain state and local statutes provide 
for punitive damages or uncapped compensatory damages.
As is the case with the win–loss data, information about 
damage awards may be affected by the two separate case 
streams, that is, litigation and arbitration. One distortion in 
the litigation stream arises because litigation is time-con-
suming and expensive. Consequently, plaintiffs’ lawyers 
have little economic incentive to work on employment 
claims from low-wage employees.74 Fifteen years ago, John 
Donohue and Peter Siegelman found that cases might not be 
worthwhile for plaintiffs’ lawyers to handle if the employee 
earned less than $450 per week.75 Howard’s 1995 article 
reports the results of a survey of 321 plaintiffs’ lawyers that 
found the lawyers required a retainer of $3,000 to $3,600.76 
Similarly, Maltby reports a 1995 study of plaintiffs’ lawyers 
which found that lawyers would not take a case unless the 
employee had a potential of at least $60,000 in back-pay 
damages.77 These findings suggest that comparatively higher 
paid employees are far more likely to find a lawyer and get 
their day in court.
The economic incentives for attorneys to take employ-
ment cases to arbitration are mixed. Arbitration typically 
consumes less time than litigation. Consequently, arbitration 
may lower the economic threshold for lawyers to take em-
70 29 U.S.C. § 621-634 (1994 & Supp. I 1995).
71 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213 (2000).
72 42 U.S.C. 1981 (1994).
73 See: Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 223, 
281 (2000).
74 In this instance, a “fees case” is a lawsuit in which the recoverable dam-
ages are so low that the attorneys’ fees become the driving force in the 
case. Plaintiffs’ lawyers will not exceed their normal hourly rates by taking 
fees cases to trial, and this is the goal for lawyers working on a contin-
gency basis. This harsh reality that it is unlikely for low wage earners ever 
to see the inside of a courtroom.
75 See: John J. Donohue III and Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of 
Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 983, 1006 (1991).
76 Howard, op.cit.
77Lewis L. Maltby, Out of the Frying Pan, Into the Fire: The Feasibility of 
Post-Dispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 30 Wm. Mitchell L. 
Rev. 313, 317 (2003).
ployment cases.78 On the other hand, the low costs needed to 
defend a case reduce employers’ incentive to settle for some 
amount below defense costs. This settlement aspect of arbi-
tration may make a case less attractive to a plaintiffs’ lawyer.79 
In addition, arbitrators do not have the reputation for high 
verdicts that fairly or unfairly pertains to juries. Thus, there 
would appear, again, to be less incentive for plaintiffs’ law-
yers to take an arbitration case.
Although an attorney is essential in court, it is easier 
for a pro se plaintiff to prosecute his or her own claim in 
arbitration than in litigation. First, arbitration’s informali-
ties make it easier for unrepresented plaintiffs to pursue 
their cases. There are no motions to understand or defend, 
and less discovery to which one must respond. Moreover, 
if a case proceeds to arbitration, the procedure is relatively 
informal. Second, in many arbitration policies the employer 
(including the employer we analyze in the study below) will 
be represented by counsel in arbitration only if the employee 
first chooses to be represented by an attorney. If the plaintiff 
does not choose to be represented by counsel, a non-lawyer 
represents the employer. In the litigation context, however, it 
would be extraordinary for an employer to forgo hiring legal 
counsel merely because the employee did not have a lawyer.
Returning to the issue of awards as they relate to em-
ployee pay levels, if lower-paid employees have greater ac-
cess to arbitrations than they do to trials, it would follow that 
the average winner in arbitration would have lower damages 
than the average winner would in litigation. Moreover, if pro 
se plaintiffs are more likely to make it to arbitration than to 
trial but then lose because they do not have an attorney, one 
would expect that the average award per plaintiff (winners 
and losers) would be less in arbitration than in litigation. 
Finally, given that back pay is often a function of the time 
that has elapsed since the challenged personnel decision 
and given that arbitration is faster than litigation, arbitra-
tion should for this reason also result in lower awards than 
litigation.
The proposition that arbitration generates lower average 
awards than does litigation finds ample scholarly support. 
Eisenberg and Hill examined 70 non-civil-rights AAA arbi-
trations, 44 of which were pursued by relatively high-paid 
employees and 26 by low-paid employees.80 The median 
award for the higher-paid employees was $94,984, the mean 
was $211,720, and the standard deviation was $313,624. The 
lower-paid employees had a median award of $13,450, a 
78 Furthermore, lawyers can take a chance on a fees case because arbitra-
tion is a relatively quick process; arbitrators are not hostile to hearing such 
a case (unlike federal court justices); and arbitrators have no overcrowded 
docket to worry about.
79 See: Herbert M. Kritzer, Investing in Cases: Can You Profit from Contin-
gency Fee Work?, Wis. Law., Aug. 1997, at 10.
80 Eisenberg and Hill, at 16-19. 
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mean of $30,732, and a standard deviation of $38,723. In 
state non-civil rights court cases he median was $68,737, 
the mean was $462,307, and the standard deviation was 
$1,291,020 (n = 79). In state discrimination cases the median 
was $206,976 (n = 68), while in federal court discrimination 
cases, the median was $150,500 (n = 408). The state mean 
was $474,488, with a standard deviation of $761,297, and 
the federal mean was $336,291. For comparison, there were 
only eight AAA civil-rights arbitrations in this sample: two 
involving high-paid employees and six initiated by low-paid 
employees. The higher-paid employees had a median and 
mean award of $32,500. For the lower paid employees, the 
median was $56,096, and the mean was $259,795.81 
However tempting it may be, it’s not wise to draw 
conclusions from so few discrimination cases. In addition, 
the numbers for all cases are difficult to interpret because 
the standard deviations were high, a signal of wide varia-
tion in the awards. Clearly, a number of extremely high and 
extremely low awards greatly influenced the means and, to a 
lesser extent, the medians.
Bingham’s study of AAA arbitration outcomes also war-
rants consideration.82 She ran analyses that excluded outliers 
to reduce the standard deviation with the hope of providing 
a more accurate picture of average awards. There is, however, 
a problem with trying to use Bingham’s study to support 
an argument for or against the fairness of arbitration. Of 
the 171 cases studied, 75 percent involved employees who 
claimed breach of contract and 18 percent involved employ-
ers who made the same claim.83 Thus, over 90 percent of 
her sample involved contract claims, rather than statutory 
discrimination claims. This same issue arises with Eisenberg 
and Hill’s 70 non-civil-rights AAA cases and the state-court 
non-civil-rights cases. These cases are difficult to compare 
with each other and nearly impossible to compare with 
81 Id.
82 Bingham (1997), op.cit.
83 Id. at 374-376.
discrimination cases, because the damages assessed depend 
more on the contract than on the law.
Bingham places the final damage awards in a helpful 
context by also listing the amount demanded. Maltby did 
this several years earlier, but took this idea one step further 
by comparing damage demands to awards in arbitration 
as compared to litigation.84 He then adjusted the numbers 
further by factoring in all plaintiffs, including those who 
prevailed in addition to those that received just some sort 
of award. Maltby compared AAA cases from 1993 through 
1995 to federal court cases from 1994. The mean demand 
in arbitration was $165,128, while that in federal court was 
$756,738. In arbitration the mean award was $49,030, an 
amount equal to 25 percent of the demand. In litigation the 
mean award was $530,611, an amount equal to 70 percent 
of the demand. Instead of simply examining the percentage 
of the demand that successful plaintiffs received, Maltby 
calculated the percentage of the demand that all plaintiffs 
received. In other words, he included unsuccessful plaintiffs 
in this calculation. Under this adjusted outcome, plaintiffs 
received 18 percent of their demands in arbitration and 10.4 
percent in litigation.85
Using award demands as a factor in the calculation is a 
clever attempt to help control for the problem of comparing 
damage awards from different case streams. The problem 
with using demands as a “control,” however, is that it counts 
on the lawyer’s request being an accurate reflection of the 
value of the case.
A number of factors degrade the accuracy of award de-
mands as a proxy for a case’s underlying worth. For example, 
because of arbitrators’ reputation for settling demands at a 
midpoint, claimants might make artificially high demands, 
and thus raise the prospective mean. Another source of 
unreasonably high demands in arbitration might come 
from pro se plaintiffs, who may not understand the damage 
scheme and request an unrealistic number. Because there 
are more pro se plaintiffs in arbitration, there would be more 
unrealistic demands in that case stream. In contrast, the fact 
84 Maltby, at 48.
85 Id.
The proposition that arbitration 
generates lower average awards 
for employees than does 
litigation finds ample scholarly 
support.
1	 The	Center	for	Hospitality	Research	•	Cornell	University	
that litigation involves lawyers more heavily may raise de-
mands in court. Lawyers in both forums may have factored 
their fees into the demand, because they plan to use that 
amount as a settlement tool. The higher costs of litigation 
would mean higher fees and, thus, higher demands in litiga-
tion. The most likely result of the above factors, however, is 
that they provide the “noise” that distorts empirical assess-
ments of the damage question.
Conclusions	from	Empirical	Research	about	the	
“Fairness”	of	Arbitration
Despite the flaws of existing studies, I am confident of the 
following conclusions regarding the “fairness” of arbitration. 
First, there is no evidence that plaintiffs fare significantly 
better in litigation than in arbitration. In fact, litigation may 
favor employers. Second, arbitration is faster than litigation, 
thereby reducing the time that the parties are involved in 
a process that can be both heart wrenching and financially 
crippling. Third, the question of whether damages are higher 
in arbitration or in litigation is too difficult to resolve based 
on available data. Further research is warranted on all three 
factors, especially on the questions of win–loss records and 
damages. 
Even if data will help resolve the empirical questions, 
certain other questions are harder to answer. For example, 
implicit in the assertion that arbitration is unfair to employ-
ees is the belief that higher employee-win rates and higher 
average damage awards mean a fairer system. My view is 
that a fair system means that employees who have been dis-
criminated against are fairly compensated, while employers 
who are unfairly accused of discrimination are exonerated 
with minimal expense or damage to their reputation.
Even if we could determine that either litigation or 
arbitration produced “fairer” results, that system would not 
necessarily be the preferred method for resolving discrimi-
nation cases. As a good attorney will advise a client, the best 
settlement is one that the parties freely achieve on their own. 
The cases that make it to arbitration or litigation represent 
failures in systems designed to conciliate and resolve dis-
putes. Thus, the critical question is not what happens at the 
final stage, but instead what happens to the claims that never 
make it that far.
Potential	Value	of	Mandatory-arbitration	Policies
Some management attorneys criticize mandatory- 
arbitration policies because they fear that the number of 
claims will increase and employers’ positions will be com-
promised by the reduced barriers to entry, relaxed rules of 
evidence, the likelihood that an arbitrator will award some 
recovery in most cases, and the absence of appeals. Such 
attorneys are, therefore, often reluctant to recommend man-
datory arbitration policies because they fear that their client 
will lose cases in arbitration that could be won in court. 
More cynically, some management lawyers believe that 
in court they can intimidate or out litigate the employee’s 
counsel, whereas they believe that arbitration will level the 
playing field. Despite this advice, a growing number of For-
tune 1000 companies maintain alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR) systems culminating in arbitration for at least some 
of their employees.
I cannot present direct evidence on why employers 
adopt internal dispute systems resulting in arbitration for 
their non-union employees, but it’s clear that certain types 
of employers who face a high volume of low-value claims 
maintain a policy of employment arbitration. Such an em-
ployer is the subject of the empirical study presented next.
Employers with a high volume of low-value claims im-
plement ADR programs for two main reasons. First, disputes 
that are not resolved quickly rack up legal expenses, decrease 
productivity by taking management time, damage morale, 
and promote turnover.86 Second, employers are tired of “de 
facto severance” and wish to limit the value and incidence 
of nuisance settlements. In particular, once an employer de-
velops a reputation for paying de facto severance, more ter-
minated employees are encouraged to file an EEOC charge. 
Couple such a reputation with the overlapping patchwork 
of employment statutes and the courts’ reliance on circum-
stantial showings to allow a case to proceed, a fairly large 
percentage of employees fits into some legally protected class. 
86 See Sherwyn et al., at 80-83.
Cases that make it to arbitration 
or litigation represent failures in 
systems designed to conciliate 
and resolve disputes.
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Moreover, many employers simply detest settling frivolous 
cases. While obviously averse to being called racist or sexist, 
many innocent employers dislike settling what they consider 
to be a potentially explosive, though baseless allegation. The 
economics of litigation, though, induce some employers into 
just such settlements. 
As a separate point, some people compare an EEOC 
settlement to a settlement arising out of a union contract. I 
see no comparison, because collective-bargaining agree-
ments have just-cause standards for termination. In such 
disputes an employer may rationalize settling a case even 
when the employer believed that it had cause simply because  
room exists for reasonable people to disagree on whether 
cause existed in any given case. Discrimination is a different 
matter from just-cause dismissal. 
Mandatory arbitration arguably ends de facto severance, 
because arbitration lowers the costs of defense, including 
potentially adverse publicity.87 Instead, employers can de-
fend those claims that they believe are baseless. At the same 
time that arbitration reduces employers’ incentive to settle 
baseless claims, arbitration programs reduce employers’ abil-
ity to defeat meritorious claims by delaying or intimidating 
the employee into a withdrawal or substandard settlement. 
Instead, meritorious claims need quick and equitable resolu-
tion, or else the employer will face an adverse arbitration 
result that is expensive, albeit swift.
I contend that many employers implement mandatory-
arbitration systems as the final part of a dispute resolution 
program so that they can avoid the negative consequences of 
lawsuits and other problems at the workplace.88 If employ-
ers implement ADR policies for those reasons, the issues of 
win–loss rates, time, and damages are relevant only if many 
claims reach an adjudication stage. If not, researchers should 
compare resolutions between the two systems, capturing 
those claims that are resolved before they reach the formal 
adjudication process, whether they be in the arbitration or 
litigation setting. In that regard, I offer below the experience 
of one employer (whom I call EDP Employer 1) that faces a 
high volume of low-value claims, as well as publicly available 
data from the EEOC and the federal courts, to provide an 
orientation to the type of research that is needed in this field.
87An arbitrator’s fees could easily exceed $1,000 (see: Katherine Van Wezel 
Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow 
Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 Denver University Law Review 1017 
(1996), at 1037); however $1,000 may be a paltry sum in comparison with 
the legal fees accrued during litigation (see: Sherwyn et al., at 132-133).
88 A test of the hypothesis that employees and employers will almost never 
both choose arbitration after a dispute has arisen was based on the data 
from a voluntary arbitration program and survey results from a sample of 
over 300 lawyers. The survey found that post-dispute voluntary arbitra-
tion will rarely be accepted by both sides. See: Sherwyn et al., at 132-33.
A	New	Path	for	Empirical	Research
This part of the report offers a preliminary approach for 
comparing the fairness and efficacy of arbitration with that 
of litigation that takes into account that full life history of a 
claim from the initial filing to resolution. Because a com-
prehensive data set remains to be developed, this analysis 
uses publicly available data on court resolutions and claims 
experience in the EEOC as a proxy for measuring claims 
experience in litigation. I compare that outcome with the 
claims experience at EDP Employer 1, a firm that uses an 
ADR system culminating in mandatory arbitration. This is as 
an example and not meant to be representative.
Background information and data. I’ve already 
explained that since most cases are not resolved in arbitra-
tion or litigation, trial and arbitration results are necessar-
ily imperfect measures of the fairness and efficacy of the 
two systems. A more useful barometer would focus on the 
resolutions of discrimination cases that take place during 
conciliation, mediation, and settlement negotiations.
During the last twelve years, employees filed, on average, 
75,797 discrimination claims each year with the EEOC.89 In 
addition, employees filed a similar number of claims with 
various state and local agencies,90 for a total of approximately 
150,000 discrimination claims each year. Various methods 
are used to resolve these disputes. Most states have investiga-
tion and conciliation processes, as described earlier in this 
report, including formal mediation or adjudication systems. 
Because I do not have access to the states’ data, this report 
compares the EEOC’s resolution process (and the data from 
federal courts) with the data from EDP Employer 1, as a 
representative company.
Even though the EEOC performs a triage on cases 
before investigation, its statistics do not separate resolutions 
by classification. Instead, all cases are reported in the EEOC 
charge statistics, which do, however, provide some insight 
into the fate of cases filed with the EEOC.91 From 1992 
through 2002, the EEOC resolved, on average, 90,138 cases 
per year.92 The EEOC uses the following eight sometimes 
overlapping classifications for resolved cases (described in 
the box on the next page): (1) administrative closure; (2) 
merit resolutions; (3) no reasonable cause; (4) reasonable 
cause; (5) settlements; (6) successful conciliation; (7) unsuc-
cessful conciliations; and (8) withdrawal with benefits. Be-
cause of the overlap, I slot such cases into two categories: (1) 
89 EEOC Charge Processing Statistics, at www.EEOC.gov/stats/charges.
html (last visited November 28, 2004).
90 Sherwyn et al., at 76.
91 Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, Priority Charge Handling 
Procedures, loc.cit.
92 Id.
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merit resolutions and (2) non-merit resolutions (including 
administrative closures and findings of no reasonable cause). 
From 1992 through 2002, the percentage of cases 
labeled as merit resolutions averaged 15.5 percent per year. 
The numbers from 1997 through 1999, show an uptrend 
in the rate of merit resolutions from 11.0 percent to 16.5 
percent. In 2000, merit resolutions constituted 21.3 percent 
of cases, a percentage that rose to 22.1 percent in 2001, but 
eased to 20.0 percent in 2002.
This rise in merit resolutions is somewhat offset, how-
ever, by the rise in unsuccessful conciliations. (In such cases 
a “cause” finding by the agency still could not be resolved 
during conciliation and, thus, the employee received no ben-
efits.) The percentage of unsuccessful conciliations in 1997 
was 2.8 percent, rising to 3.3 
percent in 1998, and 4.9 per-
cent in 1999. The percentage 
continued to escalate between 
2000, when it was 6.6 percent, 
and 2001, at 7.3 percent. Un-
successful conciliations fell off 
slightly in 2002, at 5.2 percent.93 
By subtracting the percentage 
of unsuccessful conciliations 
from the merit resolutions  one 
can calculate that between 1992 
and 2003, on average, 10.9 per-
cent of the cases filed involved 
“remunerated resolutions,” with 
a mean award of $16,993.90.94 
The overall per-claim figure was 
$2,052.82.95 Having given these 
averages, it’s worth noting that 
these figures may not represent 
the average award for each 
employee, because the report 
is based not on the number of 
plaintiffs but on the number 
of claims, and a claim could 
include class actions embracing 
hundreds of plaintiffs.
Between 1999 and 2003, 
employees filed an annual aver-
age of 21,228 cases in federal 
court. All of them received 
right-to-sue letters after the 
EEOC found either cause or no 
cause.96 By no means do all of 
these cases get to trial. In the 
18,035 terminations recorded 
in 2003, for example, no court 
action ensued in 3,158 cases.97 
Of those that at least went to a judge, the parties to the ac-
tion and the courts resolved 10,739 cases prior to pre-trial 
and 3,441 cases during or after pre-trial. Only 697 (or 3.9%) 
of the cases made it to trial. Thus, one could say that no 
93 Id.
94 Id. “Remunerated resolutions” was computed by dividing the number of 
remunerated cases by the total number of cases, with a mean established 
as the total dollars awarded divided by the number of remunerated resolu-
tions.
95 Id. The “per-claim” figure derived from dividing the total number of 
dollars awarded by the total number of charges resolved.
96 Judicial Business of the United States Courts 2003 tables C-2A and C-4, 
(www.uscourts.gov/judbus2003/contents.html). 
97 Id., table C-4.
EEOC Case Classifications
Administrative Closure. Charge closed for administrative reasons, which include: 
failure to locate charging party, charging party failed to respond to EEOC 
communications, charging party refused to accept full relief, closed due to the 
outcome of related litigation which establishes a precedent that makes further 
processing of the charge futile, charging party requests withdrawal of a charge 
without receiving benefits or having resolved the issue, or no statutory jurisdiction.
Merit Resolutions. Charges with outcomes favorable to charging parties or charges 
with meritorious allegations. These include negotiated settlements, withdrawals with 
benefits, successful conciliations, and unsuccessful conciliations.
No Reasonable Cause. EEOC determines no reasonable cause to believe that 
discrimination occurred based upon evidence obtained in investigation. The charging 
party may exercise the right to bring private court action.
Reasonable Cause. EEOC determines reasonable cause to believe that discrimination 
occurred based on evidence obtained in investigation. Reasonable cause 
determinations are generally followed by efforts to conciliate the discriminatory issues 
which gave rise to the initial charge. Note: Some reasonable cause findings are 
resolved through negotiated settlements, withdrawals with benefits, and other types 
of resolutions, which are not characterized as either successful or unsuccessful 
conciliations.
Settlements (Negotiated). Charges settled with benefits to the charging party as 
warranted by evidence of record. In such cases, EEOC or a FEPA is a party to the 
settlement agreement between the charging party and the respondent (an employer, 
union, or other entity covered by EEOC-enforced statutes).
Successful Conciliation. Charge having a reasonable-cause determination is closed 
after successful conciliation. Successful conciliations result in substantial relief to the 
charging party and all others adversely affected by the discrimination.
Unsuccessful Conciliation. Charge having a reasonable-cause determination is 
closed after efforts to conciliate the charge are unsuccessful. Pursuant to Commission 
policy, the field office will close the charge and review it for litigation consideration. 
Note: Because “reasonable cause” has been found, this is considered a merit 
resolution.
Withdrawal with Benefits. Charge is withdrawn by charging party upon receipt of 
desired benefits. The withdrawal may take place after a settlement or after the 
respondent grants the appropriate benefit to the charging party.
CHR	Reports	•	July	2006	•	www.chr.cornell.edu			 21
more than about 10 percent of the nearly 150,000 discrimi-
nation cases filed with the EEOC each year under federal 
statutes resulted in any court action (for example, 14,877 in 
2003). For federal court trials that year the average award per 
lawsuit was $95,949, while the average award per remuner-
ated lawsuit was $336,291.98
Results	and	Discussion
The EEOC data and federal court data are useful for two 
purposes. First, an indication that a vast number of cases 
are either dismissed or resolved without court action un-
dermines the argument that arbitration will interfere with 
the development of the law and public accountability. The 
current statutory regime purports to emphasize conciliation, 
and the EEOC has adopted a formal mediation process.99 
The EEOC and federal court data provide a plausible context 
to compare the results of Employer 1’s arbitration policies. 
Before comparing results, however, let me briefly describe 
the employer’s policies.
This employer provides the following six steps to resolv-
ing disputes: (1) an open-door policy: the employee meets 
with his immediate supervisor or someone higher in the 
chain of command; (2) an ombudsman: the employee can 
98 Eisenberg and Hill, op.cit.
99 Even under the EEOC’s case-handling protocol, only a small number of 
charges filed with the agency are likely to be resolved in a public fashion 
and provide formal legal precedent.
talk to a confidential advisor who will advise the employee 
and act as a mediator or factfinder; (3) a conference: the 
employee meets with someone from the dispute resolu-
tion program office and chooses a method for resolving the 
dispute; (4) internal informal mediation: a company adviser 
mediates the dispute; (5) formal mediation: a AAA media-
tor attempts to resolve the dispute; and (6) arbitration. With 
regard to arbitration, the company will not be represented 
by an attorney if the employee chooses to proceed without 
representation. If the employee wishes to bring counsel, 
however, the company has an ERISA plan that provides 
some funds for attorneys’ fees.
The employer’s data span 1993 to 2004. As Exhibit 1 
reveals, the number of calls (to the DRP) made by Employer 
1’s employees rose from 292 in 1993 to 1,403 in 2004. During 
these same years, in contrast, the number of EEOC’s receipts 
remained relatively constant. Two factors help explain the 
increase in the number of Employer 1’s claims. First, the 
company greatly expanded its operations during that time 
period. In 1993, the company had approximately 5,000 
employees, while today it has 40,000 employees. Second, 
Employer 1’s employees became increasingly comfortable 
with the DRP. As the DRP became more a part of Employer 
1’s corporate culture, employees’ became more apt to use the 
system, as their comfort level and their knowledge of the 
system grew.
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The second result, presented in Exhibit 2, offers com-
parisons of differences in the number of claims that use 
external resources. For EEOC cases, I classify cases using 
external resources as those that go to federal court. With 
regard to Employer 1, that comparison involves cases that go 
to arbitration. Employer 1’s cases that are resolved after an 
internal mediation arguably may be equated to those EEOC 
claims that are resolved during the agency’s investigation 
and conciliation process. Employer 1’s cases that are resolved 
by external mediation are similar to those that are resolved 
through the EEOC’s in-house mediation process.
While I do not have data on how many EEOC cases are 
resolved at each level, we can apply the annual average num-
ber of cases filed in federal court from 1999 to 2003 (21,228), 
which we used above.100 If the total number of discrimina-
tion cases that could be filed in a given year is comparable 
to the number of cases filed with EEOC in that year, that 
would mean 21,288 out of 81,762 (or 26%) end up in court. 
Even in the unlikely event that the volume of cases filed with 
state agencies doubled that number, 13 percent of the EEOC 
cases filed would use external resources. For Employer 1, 
100 Judicial Business of the United States Courts 2003 tables C-2A and C-4.
in contrast, fewer than 5 percent 
of the cases used the external 
resource of arbitration and under 
10 percent used internal mediation, 
external mediation, or arbitration. 
What Exhibit 2 makes clear is that 
the percentage of cases that use 
external resources in the EEOC 
and litigation system is manifestly 
greater than the percentage of 
cases that use external resources by 
Employer 1. This disparity holds 
even under the most conservative 
of assumptions. 
If employers implement DRP 
policies with a goal of resolving 
cases more quickly, they manifestly 
succeed. As Exhibit 3 makes clear, 
the average processing time of 
an EEOC case is 373 days—not 
including cases that end up in 
court and stretch on for an average 
709 days. In contrast, Employer 
1’s cases are resolved in under two 
weeks, on average.
The benefits of comparatively 
quicker case-disposition time 
are so considerable that they are 
worth reviewing here. Decreased 
case-disposition time can increase productivity, save money 
on outside counsel, and reduce employee turnover. Indeed, 
more than 75 percent of the employees who used Employer 
1’s DRP system remained employed after their case is 
resolved. At the same time, since instituting its DRP system, 
Employer 1 has cut its outside counsel fees in half. 
One pivotal derivative point is that reduced case- 
disposition time may also contribute to reduced damages. 
When 81 percent of the claims are resolved in less than one 
week, employer back-pay liability diminishes considerably. 
In the experience of Employer 1, the average award per 
complaint is $576, less one-third of the EEOC’s $1,996.54 
per-claim average.
Of course, other factors may contribute to per-claim 
average differences in damage awards. The EEOC takes only 
those claims in which the employee has a legally cognizable 
claim. In contrast, Employer 1 counts any claim made to 
the DRP system. This increase in non-cognizable claims 
increases the denominator and, thus, reduces Employer 1’s 
per-claim award average. That said, I suppose that unflag-
ging critics of arbitration can argue that Employer 1’s lower 
award figures support the claim that the arbitration system is 
unfair to employees.
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Conclusion
The data presented here are preliminary, descriptive in 
nature, and involve a single employer. Consequently, 
I cannot claim any resolution to the rich debate on 
employment arbitration. Still, some conclusions  seem 
inescapable. First, employers who wish to implement an 
enforceable arbitration system may do so. Second, employers 
who do implement such a policy can reduce turnover, 
reduce their outside counsel fees, and reduce the amount 
of time managers spend on employment-related lawsuits. 
In that light, I suggest that employers should consider an 
arbitration policy if: (1) they are publicity sensitive;  
(2) they have enough employee-relations personnel in place 
to administer a program; (3) they are confident in their 
ability to comply with the law and willing to recognize 
failures in doing so; (4) their in-house or outside counsel is 
comfortable practicing with the relaxed rules of arbitration; 
and (5) they have experienced enough discrimination 
charges to make the program a worthwhile expenditure. 
A dispute-resolution program of the type described here 
is not meant to be a magic bullet that prevents all claims 
of discrimination. Instead, the purpose of this report is 
to encourage employers and employees alike to resolve 
complaints in a manner that is equitable to all parties and, if 
possible, to avoid the heartache and expense of litigation. n
2006 Reports
Vol. 6, No. 8 Revenue Management in U.S. 
Hotels: 2001–2005, 
by Linda Canina, Ph.D., and Cathy A. Enz, 
Ph.D.
Vol. 6, No. 7 The Strategic Value of 
Information: A Manager’s Guide to 
Profiting from Information Systems, by 
Gabriele Piccoli, Ph.D., and Paolo Torchio
Vol. 6, No. 6 Development and Use of a 
Web-based Tool to Measure the Costs of 
Employee Turnover: Preliminary Findings,
by Timothy R. Hinkin, Ph.D.,  and J. Bruce 
Tracey, Ph.D.
Vol. 6, No. 5 Tipping and Its Alternatives: 
A Comparison of Tipping, Service 
Charges, and Service-inclusive Pricing, 
by Michael Lynn, Ph.D. 
Vol. 6, No. 4 An Examination of Internet 
Intermediaries and Hotel Loyalty 
Programs: How Will Guests Get their 
Points?, by Bill Carroll, Ph.D., and Judy A. 
Siguaw, D.B.A 
CHR Tool 7  A Picture Is Worth a 
Thousand Words: Using Photo-Elicitation 
to Solicit Hotel Guest Feedback, by 
Madeleine Pullman, Ph.D., and Stephani 
Robson
Vol. 6, No. 3 Compendium 2006
Vol. 6, No. 2 Why Discounting Still 
Doesn’t Work: A Hotel Pricing Update, 
by Linda Canina, Ph.D. and Cathy A. Enz, 
Ph.D.
Vol. 6, No. 1 Race Differences in Tipping: 
Questions and Answers for the Restaurant 
Industry, by Michael Lynn, Ph.D.
2005 Reports
Vol. 5, No. 13 Eight Rules for Competing 
in Hotel Real Estate Markets, by John 
Corgel, Ph.D.
Vol. 5, No. 12 Biting Off More Than They 
Can Chew: Unfulfilled Development 
Commitments in International Master 
Franchising Ventures,
by Arturs Kalnins, Ph.D.
Vol. 5, No. 11 The Agglomeration 
Conundrum: How Co-location Helps 
Some Hotels and Hurts Others, by Cathy 
A. Enz, Ph.D., Linda Canina, Ph.D., and 
Jeffrey Harrison, Ph.D.
Vol. 5, No. 10 Low-price Guarantees:  
How Hotel Companies Can Get It Right, 
by Steven A. Carvell, Ph.D., and  
Daniel C. Quan, Ph.D.
Vol. 5, No. 9 Dining Duration and  
Customer Satisfaction, by Breffni Noone, 
Ph.D. and Sheryl E. Kimes, Ph.D.
Vol. 5, No. 8 Quantifying Impact: 
The Effect of New Hotels and Brand 
Conversions on Revenues of Existing 
Hotels, by Arturs Kalnins, Ph.D.
Vol. 5, No. 7 Best-available-rate Pricing at 
Hotels: A Study of Customer Perceptions 
and Reactions, by Kristin V. Rohlfs and 
Sheryl E. Kimes, Ph.D.
Vol. 5, No. 6 An Examination of Revenue 
Management in Relation to Hotels’ Pricing 
Strategies, by Cathy A. Enz, Ph.D. and 
Linda Canina, Ph.D.
Vol. 5, No. 5 Information System Design: 
A Systematic Way to Analyze IT in Your 
Business, by Erica L. Wagner, Ph.D., 
Gabriele Piccoli, Ph.D., and Sharon 
Louthen.
Vol. 5, No. 4 Perceived Fairness of 
Restaurant Waitlist-management Policies, 
by Kelly A. McGuire and Sheryl E. Kimes, 
Ph.D.
Vol. 5, No. 3 Compendium 2005  
Vol. 5, No. 2 Why Customers Shop 
Around: A Comparison of Hotel Room 
Rates and Availability across Booking 
Channels, by Gary M. Thompson, Ph.D. 
and Alexandra Failmezger
Vol. 5, No. 1 Retaining Management  
Talent: What Hospitality Professionals 
Want from Their Jobs, by Masako S. Taylor 
and Kate Walsh, Ph.D.
2004 Reports
Vol. 4, No. 9 Making IT Matter: A 
Manager’s Guide to Creating and 
Sustaining Competitive Advantage with 
Information Systems, by Gabriele Piccoli, 
Ph.D.
Vol. 4, No. 7 Why Discounting Doesn’t 
Work: The Dynamics of Rising Occupancy 
and Falling Revenue among Competitors, 
by Cathy A. Enz, Ph.D., Linda Canina, 
Ph.D., and Mark Lomanno
CHR Reports Index
www.chr.cornell.edu
Vol. 4, No. 6 Workforce Scheduling:  
A Guide for the Hospitality Industry, by 
Gary M. Thompson, Ph.D.
Vol. 4, No. 5 Increasing Servers’ Tips, by 
W. Michael Lynn, Ph.D.
Vol. 4, No. 4 Hotel Managers’ Perceptions 
of the Blackout of ’03, by Robert J. 
Kwortnik, Ph.D.
Vol. 4, No. 3 Compendium 2004
Vol. 4, No. 2 Restaurant Revenue 
Management, by Sheryl Kimes, Ph.D.
Vol. 4, No. 1 Understanding Switchers and 
Stayers in the Lodging Industry, by Iselin 
Skogland and Judy Siguaw, Ph.D.
2003 Reports
Vol. 3, No. 5 Evolution in Electronic 
Distribution: Effects on Hotels and 
Intermediaries, by Bill Carroll, Ph.D. and 
Judy Siguaw, Ph.D.
Vol. 3, No. 4 Key Issues of Concern for 
Food-service Managers, by Cathy A. Enz, 
Ph.D.
Vol. 3, No. 3 Lodging Demand for Urban 
Hotels in Major Metropolitan Markets, by 
Linda Canina, Ph.D., and Steve Carvell, 
Ph.D.
Changes in U.S. Hotel Safety and Security 
Staffing and Procedures during 2001 and 
2002, by Cathy A. Enz, Ph.D. 
Dedicated or Combinable? A Simulation 
to Determine Optimal Restaurant Table 
Configuration, by Gary M. Thompson, 
Ph.D.
Compendium 2003
2002 Reports
Multiunit Restaurant-productivity  
Assessment: A Test of Data-envelopment 
Analysis, by Dennis Reynolds, Ph.D.,and 
Gary M. Thompson, Ph.D.
How to Compare Apples to Oranges: 
Balancing Internal Candidates’ Job-
performance Data with External 
Candidates’ Selection-test Results, by 
Michael C. Sturman, Ph.D., Robin A. 
Cheramie, and Luke H. Cashen
The Safety and Security of U.S. Hotels. A 
Post-September 11 Report, by Cathy A. 
Enz, Ph.D. and Masako S. Taylor, MMH
The Influence of Gasoline-price 
Flunctuations on U.S. Lodging Demand, 
by Linda Canina, Ph.D., Kate Walsh, Ph.D. 
and Cathy A. Enz, Ph.D.
Strengthening the Purchaser-Supplier 
Partnership (PDF 428KB)
by Judi Brownell, Ph.D. and Dennis  
Reynolds, Ph.D.
A Contemporary Model for Human  
Resources, by J. Bruce Tracey, Ph.D. and 
Arthur Nathan
Developing the Full Picture on Hotel 
Industry Averages, by Cathy A. Enz, Ph.D., 
Linda Canina, Ph.D., and Kate Walsh, 
Ph.D.
2001 Reports
Compendium 2001
 
Yield Management, by Glenn Withiam
Word-of-Mouth Communication in the 
Hospitality Industry, by Kirsti Lindberg-
Repo
Cornell University School of Hotel Administration’s  
Office of Executive and Professional Education— 
Dedicated to educating present and future leaders of the hospitality industry. Annually almost 2,000 
hospitality industry professionals at all management levels attend programs at The Cornell Hotel School 
because we are the world’s leader in hospitality management. Programs tailored to your experience level 
and your availability—offered on the Cornell University campus in Ithaca, New York; Online; and at sites 
around the world. 
www.hotelschool.cornell.edu/execed/
For program information:
Office of Executive Education
School of Hotel Administration
Cornell University
149 Statler Hall
Ithaca, NY 14853-6902  U.S.A.
Executive Education
“Every day was a new mind-stretching challenge created by teachers and colleagues, all focused on the fast-
changing and uncertain future of our business. Such an experience helped me discover different avenues 
for change, and seek new ways to increase RevPAR, maximize owner’s investment, and create a better 
environment for employees.”
 Maria L. Otero, Chief Executive Director
 Radisson Fort George Hotel and Marina, Belize
“A break-through experience 
for me. It has given me new 
insights and tools for the future, 
which will allow me to continue 
to develop my career.”
 Tony Bruno
 General Manager
 Disney’s Grand    
Californian Hotel U.S.A.
E-mail: exec_ed_hotel@cornell.edu
Phone: 607.255.4919
Fax: 607.255.8749
 
Cornell University
School of Hotel Administration
Executive and Professional Education
“A dynamic and challenging course—real-time information presented by acknowledged industry leaders produces a fast-
paced, intensive educational opportunity. A must for managers in the new millennium.”
 David C. Harper, Hotel General Manager
 Sails in the Desert Hotel, Ayers Rock Resort, Australia
 
www.chr.cornell.edu
Cornell  
Hospitality Report
www.chr.cornell.edu
